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RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN WISCONSIN
JAmES D. GHIARDI*
This article will attempt to review the majority of Wisconsin
decisions dealing with the subject known as res ipsa loquitur. It is
hoped that by doing so some of the difficulties that have presented
themselves, in the past will thereby be clarified.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur developed out of the famous
flour case of 1863,1 where, in the absence of proof of any negligence,
the trial judge said "the thing speaks for itself."
The doctrine was more fully declared in 1865 by Chief Justice
Erle in Scott v. London Dock Company :2
"When the thing is shown to be under the management of tl
defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as, in the
ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care."
The Wisconsin court in Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co.,3 stated the
conditions for the doctrine as follows: (1) The accident must be a
kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) It must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) It must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff.
The first Wisconsin case that used the term was Kirst v. The Mil-
waukee Lake Shore & Western Ry. Co.4 This was a case involving
the delivery by the railroad of three carboys of acid. The cars were
broken during the switching. The trial court overruled a motion for
nonsuit on the ground that the railroad had failed to give a full and
fair account as to how the loss occurred and hence that negligence
could be inferred to satisfy the plaintiff's requirement of proof. The
Supreme Court quoted with approval the Scott case :5
...... When the carboys were shown to be in the possession or
under the control of the defendant, and a breakage occurred
from switching, which, in the ordinary course of things, does
not happen if those who have charge of the train use proper
* Professor, Marquette Law School.
' Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299.
23 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665.
3 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954) ; See Colla v. Mandella 271 Wis. 145, 72
N.W.2d 755 (1955); Ziino v. The Milwaukee E. R. & T. Co., 272 Wis. 21, 74
N.W.2d 791 (1956).
446 Wis. 489, 1 N.W. 89 (1879).
5 See note 2 supra.
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care, this affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of a full
explanation by the carrier, that the loss or breakage did in fact
occur through the negligence or default of the agents of the
company."
Prior to this case the Wisconsin Court had found negligence on the
part of the defendant railroad on the mere happening of the event but
had not used the term merely because it had not been popularized by
the English decisions.6
It is to be noted that the first case to mention the doctrine, and
the cases that previously applied the rule of finding negligence from the
fact of accident arose out of the obligation of a carrier to a passenger
or the the consignor of goods. These cases developed the rule that the
mere fact of injury to a passenger or to goods or to adjoining property
cast upon the carrier the burden of proving that it was not at fault
or of proving a defense such as contributory negligence. This broad
rule was later limited to situations where the accident was clearly
caused by the carrier's equipment or operation, as distinguished from
some outside agency, over which it had no control.7 Originally the
burden of proof was imposed on the carrier because he had contracted
to transplant the passenger and goods safely. Hence, in the absence
of explanation by the carrier, the fact that it had not done so was on its
face a breach of contract, and further, that the carrier had undertaken
a special responsibility toward the passenger which required it not only
to exercise the highest possible degree of care, but pay for the damage
unless it could prove that it was not caused by its negligence. It then
became inevitable, since the law of negligence in the late 19th century
was to a considerable extent the law of the railroad accidents that the
phrase "res ipsa loquitur" was to become merged with the carrier's
burden of proof. This was extended to include damage to property
adjacent to the carrier's right of way.8 As a result the "presumption"
of fault against the carrier became merged, and is now so far identified
with res ipsa loquitur that the two are no longer distinguished.9 One
outstanding authority"0 points out that this is a fusion of two very
different ideas; one concerned only with what the facts in evidence may
be taken to prove, and the other with the necessity of any such proof
at all. Today, only one court still recognizes the distinction, to-wit:
6 See Galpin v. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co., 19 Wis. 637 (1865) ; Spaulding v. Chi-
cago N.W. Ry. Co., 30 Wis. 110 (1872); Spaulding v. Chicago N.W. Ry Co.,
33 ""is. 582 (1873) ; Morrison v. Phillips & Colby Construction Co., 44 Wis.
405 (1878).
7 Sommerfeld v. Chicago, North Shore & M. Ry., 173 Wis. 191, 180 N.W. 847
(1921) (breaking glass) ; Spencer v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.,
105 Wis. 311, 81 N.W. 407 (1900) (stream of water).
8 33 Wis. 582, note 6 supra.
9 See Ziino v. T.M.E.R. & T. Co., note 3 supra.
10 PROSSER-SE EssAYs ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1953).
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Missouri, where res ipsa loquitur in passenger cases amounts to a
"presumption" but in other cases to a mere permissible inference.11
The Wisconsin Court next considered the doctrine in the case of
Cummings v. The National Furnace Co.12 and adopted the Kirst13
view. There had been other cases,' 4 subsequent to the Kirst case, in
which the court held carriers liable not only to their passengers but
also to adjoining property owners, but the Cummings case was the
next to allude to it as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and apply it to
a non-carrier case. The Furnace Company was held liable to a seaman
when he was injured by the dropping of a bucket of iron ore from
a swinging crane, owned and operated by the defendant company,
while unloading the vessel on which the seaman was working. The
court stated:
"In an action for personal injury when the thing is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, or his servants, and the
accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary
care."
Our court quickly followed up with Kaples v. Orth.15 The injury
resulted when a block of ice fell from the shoulder of the defendant's
servant and struck the plaintiff while he was sitting on a stairway.
The court found an analogy in the presumption of negligence arising
in the carrier cases and rejected the contention that the presumption
was limited to a contractual relationship between the parties. It re-
viewed the earlier res ipsa loquitur cases and came to the conclusion
that this was a proper case for the application of the doctrine.
"In such case it is hardly accurate to say that negligence is pre-
sumed from the mere fact of the injury, but rather that it may
be inferred from the facts and circumstances disclosed, in the
absence of evidence showing that it occurred without the fault
of the defendant. In such case the facts and circumstances
speak for themselves and, in the absence of such explanation
or disproof, give rise to the inference of negligence. Such a case
comes within the principle of res ipsa loquitur." p. 535
This case standardized the doctrine into the form that it is known by
today. It mentioned the name of the doctrine and held that an infer-
"1 Gordon v. Muchling Packing Co. 40 S.W.2d 693 (1931) ; Hartnett v. May De-
partment Stores, 85 S.W.2d 644 (1935), PROSSER, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra p. 307.
12 60 Wis. 603, 18 N.W. 742 (1884).
:1 See note 4 supra.
'4 Wood v. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, 51 Wis. 196,
8 N.W. 214 (1881); Briesberg v. The Milwaukee, Lake Shore & Western
Railway Company, 55 Wis. 106, 12 N.W. 416 (1882) ; Luebke v. The Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, 59 Wis. 127, 17 N.W. 870 (1883).
"5 61 Wis. 531, 21 N.W. 633 (1884).
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ence of negligence arose unless sufficient proof was forthcoming from
the defendant to rebut any inference of negligence.
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Introduction. A study of the Wisconsin law in this field war-
rants a discussion of the requirements of the doctrine, to see if we can
discover exactly what they are so that we may know if they exsit in
any given case. Unfortunately the proof of facts by facts is not
capable of reduction to a set formula.
In this area we are dealing with one kind of circumstantial evi-
dence. In criminal cases the facts often establish the commission of
the crime and the fact of negligence can be proven by circumstances.
As was indicated in the material on the development of the doctrine,
our Wisconsin court was recognizing as sufficient evidence of negli-
gence, the fact that soon after the passage of a train, a fire had
started.' 6 This was done without calling it res ipsa loquitur. Circum-
stantial evidence means that from facts in evidence other facts may
reasonably be inferred. The inference rests upon a process of reason-
ing, based upon past experience. It may be strong or weak, depending
entirely upon the facts. The words res ipsa loquitur add nothing and
such a case is nothing more than a statement that this is a case where
the jury can infer negligence from the mere occurrence of the accident
itself.
There are inferences in every negligence case but the principal
difference between a res ipsa case and a specific negligence case would
seem to be as follows:
"The very basis of liability, the existence of some negligence,
may be shown by a particular kind of circumstantial evidence,
namely an unusual occurrence of a character which ordinarily
results only from negligence . . . and from which, therefore,
negligence is a reasonable inference; while in a specific negli-
gence case the careless acts or omission which constitute negli-
gence must be stated and proved. In other words, in a res ipsa
case the ultimate fact, some kind of negligence is inferred
without any evidential facts except the unusual occurrence it-
self; while in a specific negligence case there must be some
evidential facts sufficient to show some negligent acts or omis-
sions which were the proximate cause of the occurrence."'17
This concept is well illustrated in the case of Arledge v. Scherer
Freight Lines."" The court held that there could be no inference of
negligence where a fire started in the office of the defendant, near an
oil stove and which spread into the part of the building occupied by
16 See note 8 supra.
17 Harke v. Haase, 75 S.W.2d 1001 (Mo. 1934). See PROSSER, SELECTED EsSAYS,
p. 314.
18 269 Wis. 142, 68 N.W.2d 821 (1954).
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the plaintiff. The court went on to say that res ipsa loquitur could
be applied only in exceptional cases. The fire was not an unusual
occurrence and some specific act would have to be proved in order to
infer negligent conduct since it could not be inferred merely from the
happening of a fire. This case is difficult to reconcile with the early
cases involving fires along the railroad right of way where negligence
was inferred from the happenings of a fire and adjoining property
owners were allowed to recover.
B. The Inference that Someone Was Negligent. The first ele-
ment is, that on the basis of past experience the trier of fact can
conclude that such events do not ordinarily happen unless someone
has been negligent. 19
In the usual case the basis of past experience from which the con-
clusion can be drawn is one common to all of us. The courts take
cognizance of it without calling it judicial notice, and the jury recog-
nizes it as common knowledge. However, the basis may be supplied





The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not change the burden of
proving the plaintiff's case by a preponderance of the evidence. This
burden is met by satisfying the jury that it is more likely that his
injuries were caused by negligence than that they were not.
"He must do so by evidence, not mere speculation and con-
jecture, and where the probabilities are at best evenly divided
between negligence and its absence, it becomes the duty of the
court to direct the jury that there is not sufficient proof. A case
to which the doctrine is applicable is no exception to these
familiar rules. It is the plaintiff's task to make a case from
which, on the basis of experience, the jury may draw the con-
clusion that negligence is the most likely explanation of the
accident. That conclusion is not for the court to draw, or to
refuse to draw so long as there is enough to permit the jury to
draw it; and even though the court would not itself infer negli-
gence, it must still leave the question to the jury where reason-
able men may differ as to the balance of probabilities."'"
B (1). Cases Where the Wisconsin Court Refused to Infer Negli-
gence. Our court in the following cases refused to conclude that
the event that occurred would not have happened except for someone's
negligence. In Hyer v. City of Janesville,22 the plaintiff fell on an icy
19 See note 3 supra.
20 Zarnik v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 133 Wis. 290, 113 N.W. 752 (1907). Evidence was
given of a specific defect in the lever fastening of the door of a coal car;
Nelson v. Newell, 195 Wis. 572, 217 N.W. 723 (1928). Expert testimony was
introduced to establish malpractice on the part of the defendant in the use of
x-ray for treatment purposes.
21 PROSSER, SELECTED ESSAYS, 1. 319.
22 101 Wis. 371, 77 N.W. 729 (1898).
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sidewalk, the only evidence introduced was that the walk was icy and
rough and that she fell. The jury verdict for the plaintiff was re-
versed, because the court was of the opinion that there were two
possible inferences from this situation, either that the city was negli-
gent in allowing an obstruction on the sidewalk, or that the plaintiff
merely slipped on the icy walk for which the city had no responsibility.
There being two possible inferences, one actionable, the other not, the
jury could not guess. The court stated:
... where there is no direct evidence of how an accident oc-
curred, and the circumstances are clearly as consistent with the
theory that it may be ascribed to a cause not actionable, it is not
within the proper province of a jury to guess where the truth
lies and make that the foundation for a verdict." p. 377
This same result was reached where an employee sued his employer
for injuries caused by an explosion claiming a leak in the pipes under
his machine.2 3 Evidence indicated that the flow of gas could have
come from the pipes but also from the habit of a co-employee to permit
a flow of gas from his burner after it was extinguished. The court
held that there were two possible causes of the harm and the plaintiff
had to prove which one and that he did not meet the burden of proof
merely by showing that one was as probable as the other.
"The existence and probable efficacy of the defect was required
to be established by reasonably direct proof, while only the
reasonable possibility of causation by the fellow employee's
negligence need be proved to prevent presumption of a defect
being necessarily drawn from the accident."
Similar results were reached in five other cases.24
Two recent cases were controlled by the lack of this first require-
ment. The court refused to allow the application of the doctrine to
infer negligence where the plaintiff was injured when the entire build-
23 Musbach v. The Wisconsin Chair Co., 108 Wis. 57, 84 N.W. 36 (1900).
24 In Badger v. Janesville Cotton Mills, 95 Wis. 599, 70 N.W. 687 (1897), the
court said that no inference of negligence could be drawn from the fact that
a ladder broke 16 inches from the top, while the plaintiff was standing on the
5th rung of a 12 rung ladder. However, the evidence introduced in that case
established the fact that the probabilities were all on the side of a nonaction-
able cause; In Beyersdorf v. Cream City Sash & Door Co., 109 Wis. 456, 84
N.W. 860 (1901), the jury could not infer negligence from the fact that a boy
was injured by a sawing maching, for its was possible he was injured because
he did not act carefully as well as from the fact that there was no guard; The
same result was reached in Strehlow v. John Schroeder L. Co., 142 Wis. 215,
125 N.W. 429 (1910), where the plaintiff was injured when a plank fell, the
court said there was a possibility of two causes, negligence of the defendant
or negligence of a third party, hence no basis for the inference of one over
the other; In Adams v. Bucyrus Co., 155 Wis. 70, 143 N.W. 1027 (1913) where
a steel roller that fell could have fallen because of the negligent placing of it
or the act of a fellow employee; In Zurich General Accident & Liability In-
surance Co. v. Bowers, 171 Wis. 116, 176 N.W. 772 (1920) where the fall of a
coil could have been caused by the negligence of the plaintiff himself.
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ing was demolished, 25 and where the plaintiff was injured by a bowl-
ing ball hitting him on the head while he was bending over in the
locker room.26 The idea behind these cases being that everyone knows
that such accidents commonly occur without the fault of anyone unless
it is the plaintiff himself.
B(2). Cases Where the Wisconsin Court Inferred Negligence.
Our court was of the opinion that the probability of negligence was
clearly evident and available to the plaintiff in the following cases: In
Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co.,27 the plaintiff was injured while working
on the defendant's dock by the fall of one of the bracing beams. The
court held that they could not conceive of a clearer case for the applica-
tion of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The same result was reached in
Mulcairn v. City of Janesville,2 where a worker was killed by the fall-
ing of a wall of a new cistern. The court held that if the wall had
been properly constructed it is common observation and within the
common course of things that it would not have fallen, hence negligent
construction was to be inferred unless the city could explain why it
fell. This same result was reached where the plaintiff was injured
when a large timber piled in an alley, with two on the bottom and one
on top, fell. The court said that the abnormal and unexpected move-
ment of the timber under the defendant's control was the basis of an
inference of negligence.2 9 This case is difficult to explain since the
only direct testimony was that of three disinterested witnesses who
indicated that the plaintiff could have bumped the logs with the wagon
he was pulling down the alley. It appears to be indistinguishable from
the previous cases holding that no such inference was probable. 30 In
Dunham v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co.,3s the court held that a truck
traveling down the road with a wire 30-40 feet trailing behind which
hooked around the plaintiff's ankle was clearly a case for the applica-
tion of the doctrine, since the only inference possible was that the
defendants were negligent in allowing the wire to trail.
As can be readily noted, most of these cases are all cases where
there is a basis of experience from which a reasonable man may con-
clude that negligence was a more probable explanation than any other.3 2
Of course there are very few res ipsa loquitur cases in which all other
possible inferences can be excluded. However, it must be reasonable
for the jury to exclude these other inferences and say that it was most
25 Dahl v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co. 234 Wis. 231, 289 N.W. 626 (1940).
26 DuBois v. DuBouche, 262 Wis. 32, 53 N.W.2d 628 (1951).
27 Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 136 Wis. 307, 117 N.W. 803 (1908).
2867 Wis. 24, 29 N.W. 565 (1886).
29 Peschel v. KIug, 170 Wis. 519, 175 N.W. 805 (1920).
30 See note 24 supra.
31228 Wis. 250, 280 N.W. 291 (1938).
32 This appears to be true except for Arledge v. Scherer Freight Lines (fire)
DuBois v. DuBouche (bowling ball); and Peschel v. Klug (timber), supra.
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probable that the defendant was negligent. This inference need not be
an exclusive or compelling one. It is enough that the court cannot say
that reasonable men could not draw it. 3
A well reasoned case in which the first requirement was found
to be present involved a customer of a bank who was injured by the
unexpected explosion of the tear gas system.3 4 The bank claimed that
it could not be a case for res ipsa loquitur since it did not manufacture,
inspect or manually operate the system. The facts were that the system
could be set off only by stepping twice on a foot lever. The defendant
claimed that the fault had to be attributed to the company that installed
and serviced the system. The court held that it was a proper case for
the doctrine since the inference was that negligence in maintenance,
inspection or manual control caused the accident. There was clearly
an inference of negligence, and the mere uncertainty as to which of
the several acts on the part of the defendant bank actually caused it,
was insufficient to prevent its application.
C. Inference that the Defendant was Negligent. It is never
enough for the plaintiff to prove merely that he has been injured by the
negligence of someone, it is necessary to bring it home to the defend-
ant. In any case where it is quite clear that it is at least equally
probable that the negligence was that of a third person, or non-
actionable cause, the court must direct the jury that the plaintiff has
not proved his case. 35 The plaintiff is assisted by the application of the
doctrine where the facts give rise to a second inference showing some
specific cause for the accident within the defendants responsibility, 36
or on a showing that the defendant was responsible for all reasonable
probable causes to which the accident could be attributed.3 7 Again the
plaintiff needs only a preponderance of the evidence, and he need not
definitely exclude all other possible conclusions. When a parked car
starts down a hill there is always a possibility that some third party
may have set it in motion, but it may still be found more likely that
the fault was that of the man who parked it.38 In a case where other
causes are in the first instance equally probable there must be some
evidence which will permit the jury to eliminate them; and the plaintiff
may be required to make some showing that there was no mishandling
of the instrumentality. This is illustrated by a case where the decedent
was electrocuted while turning on a 110 volt lamp in the basement. 39
3 Mayer v. Boynton Cab. Co., 267 Wis. 486, 66 N.W.2d 136 (1954).
34 Koebler v. Thiensville State Bank, 245 Wis. 281, 14 N.W.2d 15 (1944).
35 PROSSER, SELECTED EsSAYS, supra p. 322.
36 Dunham v. Wis. G. & Elec. Co., supra note 31.
37 See Mulcairn v. City of Janesville, supra note 28.
: Hughes v. Rentschler Floral Co., 193 Wis. 49, 213 N.W. 625 (1927) ; Colla v.
Mandella. 271 Wis. 145, 72 N.W.2d 755 (1955).
a Stark v. Badger Pub. Service Co., 176 Wis. 600, 187 N.W. 651 (1922).
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The court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the showing that
the 'inside appliance was in good shape, that the deceased was not
grounded in such a way as to be standing where a 110 volt would
kill her, and further that there was an opportunity for the 2300 volt
primary wire, that the defendant was in control of, to reach the 110
volt line going into the basement. Liability was found though there
was no control of the appliance. The court required only enough
evidence to permit a finding as to the greater probability of injury
from the instrumentality under the defendant's control than from the
plaintiff's own acts or any defective appliance.
C(1). Cases Where Control Was Present. It is commonly said
that the plaintiff must establish this second element of res ipsa loquitur
by a showing that the instrumentality which caused the accident was
under the defendant's exclusive control. Our court has put it this way:
"It is fundamental in cases where the doctrine is to be applied
that the defendant be vested with the control and management
or be responsible for the control of the instrumentality or thing
causing the injury."4
The second element was found to be present in cases previously
cited: The cistern case, 41 the electrocution case,42 the trailing wire
case,4 3 and the Bank case.44 The court in the latter case stated that
where the ownership, possession and control of the instrumentality
was in the bank the doctrine could be applied even though they had
contracted with a third party to inspect and maintain the system for
the inspection was in their control. Even in the fire case,4 5 the court
found control of the stove and premises but found no basis for an
inference of any negligence because of the fire.
C(2). Cases Where Control Was Not Present. The court re-
fused to find the necessary control in a case where the plaintiff was
injured while standing on the defendant's siding alongside a car load
of lumber that belonged to the plaintiff.4 6 The car was moved when
other cars standing on the same track pushed into it. There was no
showing as to what caused these others to move but the court said
that there was no control in the defendants for there was no evidence
that its employees were managing and using the track. A similar
result was reached where the plaintiff fell, while walking down the
aisle of defendant's train, when she tripped over two suitcases in the
40 Dubois v. Dufouche, note 26 supra.
41 See note 28 supra.
42 See note 39 supra.
43 See note 31 supra.
44 See note 34 supra.




aisle.4 7 The court said that the personal baggage of the passengers
was not under the control of the defendant. In Quass v. Milwaukee
G. L. Co.,4 1 an explosion in the basement from leaking gas was not
attributed to the defendants where they had control of 5 feet of pipe
and another 180 feet of house piping was under the control of the
plaintiff. A more difficult case to explain is Ashton v. Chicago V. W.
RR. Co.49 where a fire was alleged to have been started by a charcoal
heater in one of the defendant's refrigerator cars, which was coupled
to a car of lumber owned by the plaintiff. The court found no specific
acts of negligence, and refused to infer any negligence since the car
was not under the control and management of the railroad while
merely parked on the track. (The Bill of Lading in the instant case
placed all risk of loss on the consignor in the absence of proof of
negligence.) How this differs from the recent Scherer case 50 is difficult
to explain unless the Bill of Lading involved was controlling.
The Wisconsin court has been fairly stringent in its interpretation
of this requirefient. The court refused to apply the doctrine where
plumbers were searching for a gas leak, and fire flashed from a hole in
a wall through which the plumbers had chiseled to check the joints,
on the theory that the plumbers were not in exclusive control of the
building.5 ' A recent Louisiana case held just the opposite.52 In an
interesting, recent case, a car load of sand was spotted on the em-
ployer's trestle to be unloaded by his employees. While unloading it
the car tipped over killing the plaintiff's decedent. The court held that
there could be no inference of negligence on the part of the railroad
since the car was in the control of the decedent's employer and not the
defendant.53 (There was evidence to the effect that the springs were
defective but the jury found the car could have lost its balance because
of the unloading and regardless of any mechanical defect.)
It is apparent that in all of the foregoing cases the concept of
possession appears to be an element of the control necessary for the
application of the doctrine, i.e., possession of the instrumentality that
4 Stimson v. Milwaukee Lake Shore and West Ry. Co., 75 Wis. 381, 44 N.W. 748(1890).
4 168 Wis. 575, 170 N.W. 942 (1919).
49198 Wis. 618, 225 N.W. 328 (1928).
50 See note 18 supra.
51 Implement Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Golden, 257 Wis. 532, 44
N.W.2d 264 (1950).52 Talley et al v. Brock Furniture Co. et al, 81 So.2d 443 (La. 1955). This was
an action for damages caused to plaintiff's building as a result of water which
escaped from the pipes or a valve of an air conditioning unit being installed
in the office of a tenant. Evidence was to the effect that on the night of the
accident (10 days after installation) the temperature dropped to 23 degrees,
and that similar valves had on other occasions froze and burst. The court
applied res ipsa loquitur stating that the fact of possession and control by de-
fendant is not always an essential element.
53Rucktenwald v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific RR. Co., 261 Wis. 611,
53 N.W.2d 714 (1952).
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caused the accident. The courts do not mean that there must be an
actual physical possession of the particular thing that is involved but
merely a right of control as in the Koehler case. 54 This right of control
had to exist at the time of the accident.
This limitation on control appeared to be the law in Wisconsin
until the Ryan case.55 The court there adopted a liberal view with
reference to control. By analogy to the exploding bottle cases, namely
that the control required for the doctrine to apply, is not control of
the physical cause of the injury at the time of the injury, but control
at the time of the alleged negligent act, the court eliminated the re-
quirement of control at the time of the accident.
"Some courts have said that it is enough that the defendant was
in exclusive control at the time of the indicated negligence.
It would be far better, and much confusion would be avoided,
if the idea of 'control' were discarded altogether, and if we
were to say merely that the apparent cause of the accident must
be such that the defendant would be responsible for any negli-
gence connected with it."5
The rule of the exploding bottle cases would now appear to be the
law in Wisconsin. These are primarily decided on the ground of public
policy, for in almost every case the bottle had passed out of the
possession of the defendant. The courts reason that without the appli-
cation of the doctrine there would be no recovery and recovery should
be allowed. 57 The manufacturer or bottler is to be subject to liability
based upon control at the time of the alleged negligent act, that is the
time of manufacture or bottling, with no requirement as to control of
the use of the bottle or appliance, that is control at the time of the
alleged accident. The attack on the applicability of the doctrine will
have to be on the theory that no negligence can be inferred merely
from the happening of the event but the Ryan case will prove to be
a stumbling block. It was equally probable, in the Ryan case, to infer
that there were other causes like a latent defect, an unavoidable acci-
dent, or an unknown force, but the court held that the probabilities
were in favor of negligence on the part of the defendant.
The exploding bottle cases and the Ryan case have* clearly widened
the area of application of the doctrine by expanding the concept of
control. A manufacturer should manufacture his product in such a
way that it will operate efficiently and properly under normal circum-
stances. However, in the absence of proof of negligence in the manu-
facture or in the absence of proof of what caused the accident, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not be applied unless there is addi-
54 See note 34 supra.
55 See note 3 supra.
3r PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, (2d ed. 1955) p. 206.
57 Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 271 S.W. 497 (Mo. 1925).
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tional evidence to take the inference of negligence on the part of the
manufacturer out of the field of mere surmise and conjecture. In most
of the exploding bottle cases the plaintiff had to, by additional evidence,
negate the possible inference that some third party had meddled or
that there had been a change in the condition of the bottle.58 If this
proof is forthcoming, although it is circumstantial in nature, there is a
basis for the application of the doctrine. Few courts would refuse to
apply the doctrine where there is evidence of many bottles exploding
or of many defective appliances being produced, for this type of evi-
dence would then establish the cause of the accident. Once the cause
is established the fault can be readily assessed, and the elements
necessary for the inference would be established as a matter of fact.
The manufacturer then would not be held liable as an insurer for
any harm that might result.59
C(3). Question of Superior Knowledge. One common miscon-
ception arises in this area, viz, that the doctrine is to be applied
only where the plaintiff is without information as how the accident
occurred, while the defendant has such information or access to it.
This idea is derived from the reasoning in the cases dealing with
carrier's burden of proof where injury to a passenger occurred and
was included in Wigmore's formula as the basis for the doctrine. 6°
This is often given as an additional reason for applying the doctrine
where it was otherwise applicable. In only one case has our Wisconsin
Court made this reasoning a controlling factor.61 It would appear that
this factor can never be controlling and the doctrine will not be de-
feated, where applicable, merely by showing that the defendant did
not know the facts. This is illustrated in several of the foregoing
cases.62 Further, res ipsa loquitur is permitted where the plaintiff has
pleaded specific acts of negligence or has introduced definite evidence
of his own, and so has indicated that he is not without information.6 3
This problem has recently been put to rest by the Wisconsin court. 4
The court stated:
"In cases where res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the exact cause
of the accident is something of a mystery. Some courts have
held that the doctrine is applied in part because the true ex-
planation of the accident is more accessible to the defendant
58 Johnson v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Willmar, Inc., 20 Negligence Cases
266, 51 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1952).
59 See 1954 INs. L. JOURNAL 616.
60 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, (Third Edition, 1945) §2509.
61Mulcairn v. The City of Janesville, note 28 supra.
62 Koehler v. Thiensville Bank, note 34 supra; Peschel v. Klug, note 29 supra.
63 Dunham v. Wisconsin G. & Elec. Co., note 31 supra; Stark v. Badger Public
Service Co., note 39 supra.




than to the plaintiff. In Wisconsin that is not one of the con-
trolling conditions . . ."
D. The Defendant Was Not Contributorily Negligent. The third
requirement found in the standard formula is that the plaintiff was
not a cause. As early as 1865 the court considered the question of the
plaintiff's negligence in a case which would be called today a res ipsa
loquitur case. 65 An action was brought to recover for the killing of
the plaintiff's cow at a railroad crossing by the defendant's train. The
court said that the plaintiff had to show how the cov got on the cross-
ing and that it got there through no fault of the plaintiff, otherwise
it would balance out the inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant arising from the fact of injury alone. In a case involving
a 15 year old girl who caught her hand in a mangle that she was
operating, it was claimed that the accident was due to the unsteady
operation of the machine. The evidence showed no such unsteady
operation before or after the accident, and the court held that there
was no reasonable probability of an inference that the machine was
defective in any way.6  In the Zurich case,6 7 the court refused to infer
any negligence on the part of the defendant because the falling of
the coils could have been caused by the negligence of the plaintiff. It
would appear that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered this
as an ingredient of the first requirement, i.e., if there was contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff there could be no inference of
negligence in the first iristance, and not as a separate element. In
Matson v. Wisconsin Tel. Co.68 the court applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to a case where a truck struck a pole belonging to the
Telephone Company. The court found the first two requirements
present but sent the case back for a new trial because the trial court
refused to submit a question on whether the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence by having its pole too close to the road. In the
Ryan case,6 9 the jury found that the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent. It is interesting to note that the reporter after citing the
elements in headnote 6 of the decision added the following phrase in
parenthesis:
"In Wisconsin under our comparative negligence statute, section
331.045 such contributory negligence would not bar recovery
unless it amounted to 50 per cent or more of the whole."
In the recent Scherer case,7 0 the reporter added the following language,
after reciting the requirements and stating that it must not have been
due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
65 Galpin v. The Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., note 6 supra.66Groth v. Thomann, 110 Wis. 488, 86 N.W. 178 (1901).
67 171 Wis. 116, note 24 supra.
68256 Wis. 304 41 N.W.2d 268 (1950).
69 See note 3 supra.
70 See note 18 supra.
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"But the latter condition is subject to the application of the com-
parative negligence statute, section 331.045."
From the inference to be drawn in the Matson case and the head-
notes of the Ryan and Scherer decisions, it can be said that contribu-
tory negligence will not bar the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
but the case will be submitted to the jury with the question, was the
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence and if so, what was the per-
centage. If less than that of the defendant, he can recover. Hence,
unlike the earlier cases where it was indicated that evidence of con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, or the probability of it,
would prevent an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant,
merely because of the happening of the accident since one of the
elements was missing, the rule now appears to be that res ipsa loquitur
is still available even though there is contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff as long as that negligence did not exceed the in-
ferred negligence of the defendant.
In Wisconsin there are then but two elements in the doctrine: (1)
An accident that would not occur in the absence of negligence; (2)
The cause of the accident was an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant. The recent cases indicate that con-
tributory negligence will not bar application of the doctrine unless the
percentage is as great as the defendants. This is a correct result if




Cases involving automobile accidents have created some doubts as
to the application of the doctrine to such a situation. It has been
assumed that the doctrine would not apply to the ordinary automobile
collision case.
In a 1919 case,72 the plaintiff's son was killed when the automobile
in which he was riding, driven by the defendant, left the road and
turned over. The facts indicated that the automobile was running along
at 15 miles an hour on a smooth road when it suddenly swerved and
ran into a ditch.. After the car was righted a blow-out in the front
71 CAMPBELL-Recent Developments of the Law of Negligence in Wisconsin, 1955
Wis. L. REv. 1. "A third requirement for res ipsa loquitur is stated by some
courts. They say that the possibility of contributory negligence by the plaintiff
must be eliminated. Insofar as this bears on the exclusive control by the de-
fendant, it is mere dtplication. If it implies that the doctrine is never avail-
able when the plaintitt is guilty of some collateral contributory negligence it is
hard to justify.": See Clemon v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry. Co., 137 Wis.
387, 119 N.W. 102 (1909). In a suit for the death of a 14 year old boy who
had been killed by the defendants train at a crossing, the court indicated that
an inference of negligence could be established on the part of the deceased
person from the facts, so that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was in effect
used to establish contributory negligence.
72 Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736 (1919).
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tire was found. The court said that it was a reasonable inference
that the accident could have happened as a result of the blow out, as
well as the negligent operation of the automobile, hence the doctrine
could not be applied since there were two possible causes. The next
case involved a car that was being driven from 10-15 miles per hour
when it suddenly swerved over to the left and struck the automobile
in which the plaintiff was riding.73 There was evidence that there
were icy spots on the road. The court stated that in automobile col-
lisions, the direct cause of the accident and the controlling circum-
stances attendant thereon are usually not so within the control of a
driver as to raise an inference of negligence on his part. It is to be
noted that the Klein case was decided on the theory that the first
element, inference of negligence, was missing, the Linden case was on
the theory that the defendant was not in exclusive control of the
agency.
The next case that specifically discussed the doctrine as to auto-
mobiles was Baars v. Benda.74 The automobile involved left the road
and the only evidence as to cause was that while proceeding at a
moderate rate of speed it suddently went into a ditch on the right side
of the road and that after the accident the steering apparatus was
found broken. The rule of th. Linden case,75 was applied but the court
said that the doctrine was not available because two inferences were
possible, one negligence on the part of the defendant and the other
defective steering for which the driver was not responsible, hence the
first element was missing. In Storlie v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. 7 6
the doctrine was not mentioned by name but the facts were similar to
the Baars case except that there was a curve which the driver failed
to negotiate and there was no evidence of any defect such as a blow-
out or steering. The court said that there were several possible reasons
for the accident, to-wit, exhaustion of the driver, as to which the
plaintiff had assumed the risk, negligence of the driver, or a defect in
the car not attributed to the driver. There was no evidence of any
such defect, but the court held that no inference of negligence was
possible under the authority of Baars v. Benda.7 7 This appeared to be
the Wisconsin rule until the Matson case7 8 was decided. There the
court held for the first time that res ipsa loquitur could apply to an
automobile collision case, saying that ordinarily it will not apply but
this was a case where it should be applied since this was an unusual
case. It explained all previous cases on the theory that there were two
73 Linden v. Miller, 172 Wis. 20, 177 N.W. 909 (1920).
74249 Wis. 65, 23 N.W.2d 477 (1946).
75 See note 73 supra.
76251 Wis. 340, 28 N.W.2d 920 (1947).
77See note 74 supra.
78 See note 68 supra.
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actionable causes and indicated that the result in the Storlie case79 was
wrong as far as the defendant's negligence was concerned and that it
should have been inferred but that the outcome would not be any
different since the plaintiff had assumed the risk. This was finally
held to be the law in a case where the driver left the road while
negotiating a curve and lost control.80 The court said that an inference
of negligence as to management and control was allowable since the
prior automobile cases were to be distinguished for in the present
case there was no showing of a non-actionable cause, hence no specu-
lation as to such other cause was to be indulged in. In a prior case the
doctrine was held inapplicable to a situation where the defendant while
trying to get back into his lane of traffic, when a traffic officer refused
to let him make a left turn, skidded to his left on the street car track,
across a safety island and up on the sidewalk injuring the plaintiff."'
The court said the doctrine was not applicable for skidding is not an
unusual occurrence and hence no basis for an inference since skidding
could result from causes other than negligence on the part of the
plaintiff and as in the Linden case from causes not within his control.
From the foregoing it would appear that the doctrine is applicable
in automobile collision cases, where the driver leaves the road and
there is no apparent explanation for it at the time of the accident, or
where the automobile strikes a stationary object, but not where the
automobile skids, whatever the cause.
In the Churchill case, there was a strong dissent by three judges,
saying that a prima facie case of negligence was established by being
on the wrong side of the road. The court quoted from Kempfer v.
Bois :82
"The undisputed fact that the defendant's car was on the wrong
side of the road established a prima facie case of negligence on
the part of the defendant. The defendant then had the burden
of producing evidence which would overcome the inference of
negligence arising from the fact that defendant's car was on the
wrong side of the highway."
The Kempfer case was based on a similar result arrived at in a prior
decision. 83 It is difficult to see a distinction between this type of case
and a res ipsa case, unless the court is extending the application of the
doctrine that the violation of a statute is negligence as a matter of law.
These cases and the dissent mentioned above would lead us to believe
that being on the wrong side of the road in an automobile gives rise
79 See note 76 supra.80 Schimke v. Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 266 Wis. 517, 64 N.W.2d 195 (1954).
81 Churchill v. Brock, 264 Wis. 23, 58 N.W.2d 290 (1953).
82255 Wis. 312, 38 N.W.2d 483 (1949).
83 Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940).
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to an inference of negligence upon which the jury may base a verdict.
Some day the Wisconsin court may call this res ipsa loquitur.
Another case worth noting is that of Mayer v. Boynton Cab Co.8 4
The trial court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was to be
applied in a case where the plaintiff was injured when she was sud-
denly jolted while riding in a taxicab. The majority of the court did
not decide whether this was a proper case of res ipsa loquitur or not,
but J. Currie in his dissent indicated that it was. I would hesitate to
take this case as authority in an ordinary automobile case where the
guest is suddenly jolted for no apparent reason, since this involved
a passenger-carrier relationship. Its basis could be the early cases
where there was a breach of the contract of carriage and negligence
was presumed unless the defendant came forward with evidence
refuting the presumption. Perhaps the trial court had this view in
mind.s 5
The foregoing cases, except Linden v. Miller 6 involve one vehicle
only. None of them deal with the question of the application of the
doctrine in the case of the collision of two vehicles. The writer has not
discovered another case in Wisconsin that has dealt with this other
than the cases where the defendant's car was on the wrong side of the
road and the court talks about a prima facie case of negligence.8 7
Ordinarily the doctrine is not applied in such a situation other than
in cases involving carriers.8 8
Another facet of the problem in automobile cases deals with the
condition of the vehicle. The Wisconsin Court has stated that the
doctrine is not to be applied in cases involving blow-outs since other
inferences were also probable.8 9
EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE
The Wisconsin cases have not been entirely consistent or clear on
exactly what happens when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied.
The tendency has been to refer to it as a "presumption or inference."
It was originally intended to be used only as an inference.9 0 The effect
was well stated in the case of Rost v. Roberts:91
84267 Wis. 486, 66 N.W.2d 136 (1954).
85 See 32 MARQ. L. REv. 278.
86 See note 73 supra.
87 In addition to the previous cases cited see: Seligman v. Hammond, 205 Wis.
199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931). Zeinemann v. Gasser, 251 Wis. 238, 29 N.W.2d 49
(1947).8 8 For an interesting discussion of the problem and a novel suggestion for the
extension of the doctrine in such cases see, PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, p. 334-339 (1953).
89 Pawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932) ; Ormond v. Wis-
consin P. & L. Co., 194 Wis. 305, 216 N.W. 489 (1927).
90 Kaples v. Orth, note 15 supra. The court stated that the doctrine enabled thejury to infer negligence on the part of the defendant.91 180 Wis. 207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923). This case involved the use of x-ray but
the doctrine was not relied on.
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"Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which permits an inference of
negligence from the mere proof of an injury or accident where
it appears that the injury or accident would not or could not
have happened except for the negligent conduct of the defend-
ant. In such cases it is held that the plaintiff makes a case for
the jury by proof of the accident or injury, it being permissable
for the jury to infer negligence from the fact that the injury or
accident occurred. Manifestly he is in no better position, so far
as the burden of proof devolving upon him is concerned, than
if he had made out a case for the jury by affirmative evidence
of neglicence ..... It (the burden of proof) is with him at the
close as well as at the beginning, and in order for him to re-
cover the jury must find that the facts entitling him to recover
are established by a preponderance of the evidence."
In the Koehler case 92 it was said that the doctrine gives rise to a
natural inference of negligence. Of necessity, the inference of negli-
gence arising in cases of this sort are of varying strengths and so are
the proofs adduced to meet these inferences. In a great many cases
involving the existence of defective construction or maintenance in
machines, it is possible to meet the inference of negligence with refuta-
tion so conclusive as to leave not a scintilla of the inference, and in
such a case there is no issue for the jury. On the other hand, if the
counterproof is of a character that need not be treated as a verity, the
inference persist and a jury may still be permitted to weigh the infer-
ence against the so-called rebutting testimony and arrive at its own
conclusion.9 3 All doubts in this area were laid to rest by the Ryan
case,94 where the court adopted the view expressed in the above men-
ttioned cases, to-wit: The application of the doctrine gives rise to a
permissible inference, which inference of course continues in the case
until not a scintilla remains because of the positive proof introduced
by the defendant, but until that time the jury may still base a verdict
on the inference. This case is particularly interesting because the
manufacturer did introduce positive evidence that there was no defect
in the machine immediately after the alleged accident.
The case of Mayer v. Boynton Cab Co.95 raised the issue when
the trial court ruled that plaintiff's motion for a new trial was to be
granted where the jury found that the cab driver was not negligent
since in the opinion of the trial court the defendant had failed to prove
that it was not negligent. The Supreme Court reversed on the theory
that the doctrine created an inference which the jury could adopt or
reject and unless adopted was rejected and this verdict could not be
changed merely because the trial court would have inferred negligence.
92 See note 34 supra.
9o Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co., see note 27 supra.
94 See note 3 supra.
9 See note 84 supra.
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The dissenting opinion indicated that the trial court had the right to
grant a new trial if in its opinion the jury's conclusion was against the
weight of evidence. It carefully distinguished between changing the
jury answers and granting a new trial, the latter being allowed but not
the former. In the Ziino case,96 it was held reversible error to instruct
the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving it was free from
negligence. This is of particular importance since this was a carrier
case.
EFFECT-WHERE THE PLAINTIFF PLEADS SPECIFIC NEGLIGENCE
IN HIs COMPLAINT
This problem has arisen in a recent case. 7 An action was brought
to recover for the death of plaintiff's husband as a result of the de-
fendant's vehicle colliding with the decedent's house, 422 feet from
where the defendant had parked it. Death resulted not from the colli-
sion but 10 days later as a result of the shock on his heart from the
accident. The plaintiff requested an instruction on res ipsa loquitur
but the trial court refused and the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant. Upon motions after verdict the trial court concluded that
the instruction should have been given and granted a new trial. The
trial court held that the pleading of specific acts of negligence and
general negligence based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the
alternative, did not remove the doctrine from the case, for this did
not destroy conclusively any inference that the jury might draw from
the presence of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Supreme Court
upheld this by saying that it is permissible to plead the doctrine and
also allegations setting forth specific or general acts of negligence.
They overruled the contention of the defendant that the complaint
pleaded an intervening nonactionable cause which thus destroyed the
application of the doctrine.
Unhappily, the above decision does not put the problem to rest. As
the trial court in the Colla case pointed out, there are at least four
views on this subject: (1) That pleading a particular cause of injury
does not waive the right to rely on the doctrine; (2) That the right to
rely on the doctrine is waived by pleading a particular cause of injury;
(3) That the doctrine is applicable to prove a particular cause of
injury alleged; (4) That pleading a particular cause of injury does not
waive the right'to rely on the doctrine if general negligence is als6
alleged.98 It can readily be seen that only the later view has been con-
sidered in Wisconsin. The question of what happens were only specific
acts are pleaded and no general negligence is pleaded has not been
96 See note 64 supra.
07 Colla v. Mandella, see note 3 supra.




answered. Can the doctrine be applied? If not, can the complaint be
amended to apply it? The court had an opportunity in the above
decision to render a decisive decision but limited itself to the considera-
tion of the narrow point in issue.
EFFECT-WHERE PLAINTIFF INTRODUCES EVIDENCE OF
SPECIFIc AcTs
What happens when the plaintiff during the trial has himself intro-
duced specific evidence of the defendant's failure to use proper care?
Some courts have held that where the facts are disclosed by evidence
there is no room for inference, or that by attempting specific proof the
plaintiff has waived the benefit of the doctrine.
"Plaintiff is of course bound by his own evidence but proof of
specific facts does not necessarily exclude inferences. When the
plaintiff shows that the railway car in which he was a passenger
was derailed, there is an inference that the defendant has been
negligent. When he goes further and shows that the derailment
was caused by an open switch, he destroys any inference of
other causes, but the inference that the defendant has not used
proper care in looking after its switches is not destroyed, but
strengthened. If he goes further still and shows that the switch
was left open by a drunken switchman on duty, there is nothing
left to infer; and if he shows that the switch was thrown by an
escaped convict with a grudge against the railroad, he has
proved himself out of court."99
It would appear to be the better rule that only when the facts leave
no room for inferences is res ipsa loquitur out of the case. Evidence
which does not purport to furnish a complete explanation of the
occurrence should not deprive the plaintiff of the doctrine. The Wis-
consin Court in the case of Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co. 100 arrived at
this result. The plaintiff was injured by the fall of a supporting beam.
There was evidence by the plaintiff of the inadequate original fasten-
ing of the beam. The court treated this as an additional fact to be
considered, but it did not prevent the application of the doctrine. This
was confirmed in the case of Waskow v. Robert L. Reisinger & Co.' 01
which was an action to recover for injuries sustained when a door
handle came off causing the plaintiff to lose his balance and fall down
an elevator shaft. The plaintiff gave evidence as to the improper
affixation of the handle and how it could have been made safer if the
short part of the handle had been fastened on the outside rather than
in the inside. The court stated as follows:
"It will be seen that the case of plaintiff does not ... rest alone
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is by no means clear,
99 PROSSER, note 98 supra.
100 See note 27 supra.
10, 180 Wis. 537, 193 N.W. 357 (1923).
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however, that under the circumstances negligence might not
have been inferred from the mere fact that the handle became
loose."
EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE
We have seen from the previous cases that the doctrine creates an
inference to be considered by the jury. The jury may or may not
render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff based upon the doctrine. It
is clear that if the defendant offers no rebuttal testimony the verdict
can go for the plaintiff but it need not, on the other hand, it can go for
the defendant as well.10 2 On the other hand the defendant may intro-
duce evidence and still fail to overcome the inference so that the jury
can return a verdict for the plaintiff.
"If the inference of negligence asiring in a case of res ipsa
loquitur is met with refutation so conclusive as not to leave a
scintilla of the inference, there is no issue for the jury; but if
the counterproof is of a character that need not be treated as a
verity, the inference still persists and a jury may still be per-
mitted to weigh the inference against the so called rebutting
testimony."'10
3
The court in Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co.'0 4 stated the rule as
follows:
"The testimony in behalf of Philco, that it was guilty of no
negligence in the manufacturing, testing, and inspection process
employed by it, is not such undisputed proof as would remove
the question of Philco's negligence from the jury."
The same result was reached in the early case of Cummings v. Thg
National Furnace Co.105 Testimony by the defendant as to the good
repair of the machinery in question, with no direct evidence of any
negligence on the part of the defendant's servants was not enough
to prevent the jury from inferring negligence.
There are quite a few cases where it has been held that the de-
fendant's evidence was sufficient to refute the inference so as to leave
nothing for the jury. In the case of Senft v. Ed. Schuster & Co., 06
the plaintiff was seeking recovery for injuries sustained as a result of a
severe jolt or jerk while going up in one of the defendant's elevators.
The court held that the evidence of the defendant that the elevator
was free from all discoverable defects and that it was physically im-
possible to jerk or jolt the elevator in the manner testified to by the
plaintiff overcame the inference so as to leave no question for the jury.
102 See Arledge v. Scherer Freight Lines, Inc., note 18 supra. (The defendant in-
troduced no testimony but moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence.)
103 Koehler v. Theinsville State Bank, note 34 supra.
104 See note 3 supra.
105 See note 12 supra.
o10 250 Wis. 406, 27 N.W.2d 464 (1946).
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This same result was reached where the plaintiff sued to recover for
the death of an employee caused by leaking gas.' 0 7 Evidence that there
were no other methods available than those that were used to control
the gas, that little or no gas was in the boiler after the accident, was
held to be sufficient to overcome any inferences. Other cases have
arrived at the same result.
0 8
This result was also achieved in a carrier case that arose prior to
the introduction of the term res ipsa loquitur in the jurisprudence of
Wisconsin." 9 An injury was caused by the breaking of a wheel under
a freight car of the train. The evidence proved that the track was in
good order, the wheel was fairly new, and had no discoverable flaw
in it. The court directed a verdict for the defendant.
The foregoing cases support the view that the defendant may rebut
the plaintiff's case by showing that the accident is of a kind which
commonly occurs without the fault of anyone, or that the responsibility
for the apparent cause was in another, or that the accident could not
have physically happened as the plaintiff alleged. At best, his task is a
difficult one once that a case of res ipsa loquitur has been alleged.
CONCLUSION
The development of the doctrine in Wisconsin has followed the
traditional pattern and the present state of the law has been achieved
without serious dislocation of our traditional legal concepts. Some of
the inconsistencies in the application of the doctrine are readily
apparent and as a result may be avoided in the future. The main
problem will always be present, i.e. when do we have a res ipsa case?
Our court has not always been consistent in applying the doctrine to
particular cases but it is hoped that by having the cases classified in
this article that the lawyer will be better able to exercise his best
judgment in a particular case.
107 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Thomas Furnace Co., 185 Wis. 98, 201 N.W. 263
(1924).
108 See Gay v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 138 Wis. 348, 120 N.W. 283 (1909).
The controller on an electric car exploded and there was evidence to showv
that it could have exploded without anyone's negligence; Klitzke v. Vebb,
120 Wis. 254, 97 N.W. 901 (1904), where it was shown that it was physically
impossible for the door to have fallen; Vorbrich v. Geuder & Paeschke Manf.
Co., 96 Wis. 277, 71 N.W. 434 (1897). It was proven that the machine was
free from all discoverable defects.
109 Morrison v. The Phillips & Colby Construction Co., 44 Wis. 405 (1878).
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